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THE EFFECTS OF NAFTA ON 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Evelina Moreyra 
Introduction 
Over the past eight years, Mexico has gone 
from being a country with a closed economy, 
where investors faced inhibiting ownership lim-
itations, to one where barriers and restrictions 
have been reduced to increase foreign invest-
ment. The reforms of President Salinas, most 
importantly the deregulation of the financial 
services sector, have facilitated this change in 
the Mexican economy. 
Although many reforms have taken place, 
Mexico remains isolated from foreign competi-
tion in the financial services sector. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will 
bring many new foreign investors with a great 
number of financial service needs. The ques-
tion is will Mexico, with its unskilled labor force 
and lack of technology, be able to meet these 
needs? New technology and services tailored to 
individual needs must be rapidly developed and 
implemented. Although both Canada and the 
United States are able to provide the services 
needed, they are not treated fairly in Mexico. 
For example, ownership and market share lim-
its continue to exist, and cross border transac-
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tions are restricted. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement will include further deregu-
lation of the financial services sector that is 
indispensable for a more efficient financial serv-
ice system and non-discriminatory treatment 
of foreign financial firms in Mexico. 
In order to understand the effects of 
NAFTA, it is important to understand the 
changes that have occurred in Mexico. In this 
paper I review the general principles of NAFTA 
as well as the reforms that have already taken 
place in the banking and insurance sectors. I 
further describe Mexico's potential to compete 
with Canadian and U.S. financial firms, and how 
U.S. financial firms will benefit from NAFTA. 
Principles of NAFTA 
NAFTA contains three general principles 
for regulating financial services among Canada, 
Mexico and the United States. These principles 
concern commercial presence and cross-border 
services, non-discriminatory treatment, and 
procedures for entry. It is important to note 
that the provisions affect both the banking sec-
tor and the insurance sector. 
The first principle, commercial presence 
and cross border services, will allow consumers 
in NAFTA countries to have a greater number 
and a greater variety of financial services avail-
able. According to the agreement each NAFTA 
country must permit financial service providers 
of another NAFTA country to establish finan-
cial services in that country. Furthermore, each 
country must allow its residents to purchase 
financial services from another NAFTA country. 
(The Governments of Canada, The United 
Mexican States ... , p. 33) 
The second principle, non-discriminatory 
treatment, requires that all three NAFTA coun-
tries provide national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment to all NAFTA finan-
cial service providers operating in its territory. 
National treatment demands that each NAFTA 
country will grant to investors and financial 
institutions of another NAFTA country treat-
ment no less favorable than that which it grants 
to its own investors and financial institutions. 
This provision will enable U.S. banks to have 
the same powers in Mexico that Mexican banks 
have. Mexican banks are currently afforded 
national treatment in the U.S.; however, they 
do not have national access to the U.S. market. 
National access would allow Mexican banks to 
operate in all fifty U.S. states. However, the 
Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits U.S. banks 
from stepping over state lines, also limits the 
number of states in which Mexican banks can 
operate. 
The third principle, procedures for entry, 
sets forth specific guidelines for the processing 
of applications for entry into the financial serv-
ices market. Under NAFTA, each country will: 
• inform all interested investors and 
firms of its requirements for complet-
ing applications; 
• provide adequate information on the 
present state of an application; 
• make a decision on a completed appli-
cation within 120 days if possible; 
• publish guidelines of general applica-
tion no later than their effective date 
and allow interested parties the oppor-
tunity to comment on those proposed 
guidelines; and 
• provide one or more inquiry points to 
answer questions about its financial 
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services guidelines. (The Governments 
of Canada, The United Mexican 
States ... , p. 34) 
Attractiveness of Mexico's Financial 
Service Sector 
Mexico's financial service sector is rela-
tively small. Many have argued that the impact 
of U.S. investment on Mexico's financial serv-
ices sector will be negligible to U.S. investors 
because of the relatively small size of Mexico's 
market. Mexico accounts for only approxi-
mately three percent of U.S. sales worldwide. 
However, the recent changes implemented by 
President Salinas are allowing the financial 
services market to grow. The Mexican market 
presents a good prospect for growth and many 
opportunities for new business. This contrasts 
with both the Canadian and United States mar-
kets which have reached maturity and are high-
ly competitive. 
The United States has the potential to ben-
efit from providing financial services to Mexico 
for three reasons: Mexico 's services in the 
financial sector are poor; Mexico is still in the 
process of learning about financial services; and 
the United States has the knowledge and capac-
ity to provide these services. 
Banking 
Reforms 
Throughout Mexico's history, the banking 
system had been strongly regulated by the gov-
ernment. For instance, the Mexican govern-
ment was allowed control of loan rates and 
interest rates. In 1982 Mexico's eighteen com-
mercial banks were nationalized, and U.S. and 
foreign banks were allowed to maintain only 
representational offices in Mexico. This restric-
tion prohibited foreign banks from taking 
deposits or making loans in Mexico. In essence 
these foreign banks could not competitively 
provide a full range of financial services and 
products directly to Mexican individuals. 
(USITC, p. 4-41) Even more regulations were 
imposed with the May 1989 Regulations to the 
Foreign Investment Law. The reform placed 
restrictions on 141 business activities, which 
were broken down into six categories. 
(Canadian Embassy, p. 27) Among the restrict-
ed activities was banking. Banking was classi-
fied in category 1, activities reserved exclusive-
ly for the state. 
Mexican customers had been earning 
interest rates below inflation rates. Con-
sequently, money was withdrawn from the 
Mexican banking system throughout the 1980s, 
and the government realized that deregulation 
must occur. And so in July 1990, the Mexican 
Congress passed the Law on Credit Institutions 
which re-established the framework for private 
ownership of commercial banks in Mexico. The 
new law aimed for the complete privatization 
of commercial banks. In fact, as of 1992 all the 
commercial banks have now been privatized, 
with Banamex, Mexico's largest bank, being sold 
in 1991 for an outstanding 2.6 times its book 
value. 
The Law on Credit Institutions provides 
for three types of bank common stock shares: 
type A, B, and C shares. Type A shares, which 
have a majority interest of 51 percent, can be 
purchased by state development banks, the 
development trust funds, financial holding 
companies, and the Bank Fund for Savings 
Protection. The remaining shares are B shares 
and may be purchased by A shareholders, 
Mexican companies, institutional investors, and 
investment funds. (Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, 
p. 310) 
Type A and type B shareholders may issue 
type C shares. Type C shares are the only shares 
that foreign investors can purchase, and 
issuance is subject to approval by the Minister 
of Finance and Public Credit. Although the 
owners of this stock have voting rights, type C 
shares are limited to thirty percent of the total 
shares. Thus C shares provide an avenue for 
foreign commercial banks to participate in the 
Mexican financial system, but few foreign 
investors are interested in taking a small minor-
ity stake in a Mexican bank. (Hufbauer and 
Schott, 1992, p. 311) The thirty percent limit 
is critical because it effectively closes the 
Mexican banking system to foreign control. 
The Law on Credit Institutions also makes 
provisions for individual participation in com-
mercial banks and foreign interest in holding 
companies. With respect to individual partici-
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pation in commercial banks, no single Mexican 
or foreign shareholder can generally hold more 
than five percent of the capital stock. However, 
an individual may hold ten percent in special 
cases. With respect to holding companies, for-
eign banks may hold a minority interest in 
holding companies of financial groups. 
Can Mexico Compete? 
Mexican banks have one overwhelming 
disadvantage relative to banks in the United 
States and Canada: technology. Many new 
services, such as electronic payment systems, 
will need to be developed and offered to large 
corporations. This will require substantial 
investment in information technology systems 
in order to achieve the needed distribution and 
processing power while maintaining low trans-
action costs. (Dias et al., 1992) New financial 
groups offering services of banks, insurance 
companies and fund managers will also find 
information technology of great importance to 
their success. In 1990 the National Bank of 
Mexico (Banamex) had approximately fifteen 
percent of its capital investment go towards 
technology. This number should have been 
closer to forty-five percent in order for Banamex 
to be competitive with banks in Canada and the 
U.S. However, the last two years have seen an 
increase in spending for information technolo-
gy, representing approximately thirty percent 
of the banking sector's capital investment. (Dias 
et al., 1992) 
Notwithstanding the lack of technolo-
gy, the banks of Mexico have one outstanding 
advantage which will help them be competitive 
with banks in the U.S. and Canada. This advan-
tage is the loyalty of Mexican firms to Mexican 
banks. Most members of the boards of direc-
tors of the Mexican banks are often also the 
owners of large Mexican firms. This guarantees 
the Mexican banks business with these firms. 
Most Mexican firms and customers will stay 
with their domestic banks simply because they 
are familiar with them. 
Benefits from NAFTA for U.S. 
Banks 
Although U.S. banks, with their technol-
ogy and expertise, are in a strong position to 
enter the Mexican market, they face competi-
tion from more than just Mexico. U.S. banks 
are also faced with strong competition from 
Japanese and European banks. In a recent 
annual survey conducted by the Wall Street 
Journal, twenty-seven of the world's one hun-
dred largest banks are Japanese, with seven 
Japanese banks placing in the top ten. ("The 
Global Giants," p. R25) Moreover, Germany, 
France and Italy each have at least eight banks 
among the hundred largest banks. However, 
the United Stated has only seven on the list, 
with its top bank ranking only number twenty-
six . The implementation of NAFTA will give a 
clear advantage to U.S. and Canadian banks. 
Foreign banks will not be permitted to enter 
Mexico on the same terms as Canadian and U.S. 
banks. 
In addition to the general principles pre-
viously discussed in this paper, NAFTA describes 
country-specific commitments which will ben-
efit United States banks. Country-specific com-
mitments are guarantees that one NAFTA coun-
try provides to another NAFTA country. In 
essence, the agreement will finally enable U.S. 
banks to effectively compete in both the 
Canadian and Mexican banking sectors. The 
most significant benefit for U.S. banking is that 
Mexico will permit U.S. banks to establish whol-
ly owned subsidiaries in Mexico. Almost all 
market share restrictions placed on U.S. banks 
in Mexico will be eliminated during a transition 
period. U.S. banks will be allowed a gradual 
expansion in their aggregate share of the 
Mexican banking market: an eight percent 
aggregate market share in 1993 rising to fifteen 
percent in 1999. Finally, all restrictions will be 
eliminated by January 2000. Furthermore, 
Mexico's ability to place future constraints on 
foreign-owned banks will be limited. 
However, as previously stated, NAFTA will 
have a limited effect on the total international 
operations of U.S. banks. Even if U.S. banks 
invest heavily in the Mexican banking system, 
U.S. banking revenues from these investments 
will be negligible given the relatively small size 
of the Mexican market. Nonetheless, NAFTA 
may help to expand U.S. banking services to 
other Latin American countries through their 
Mexican operations. Many South American 
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countries, such as Argentina and Chile, have 
growing economies and have the need for U.S. 
expertise in banking. NAFTA may be the door-
way to these countries. 
Nonetheless , NAFTA will have some 
impact on both commercial banking and retail 
banking. With respect to commercial banking, 
U.S. banks will most likely concentrate on 
expanding their presence in Mexico by devel-
oping commercial banking relations with pri-
vatized Mexican banks and corporate entities. 
(USITC, p. 4-42) Given the fact that commer-
cial banking requires less capital investment 
and smaller staffs than retail banking, the 
expansion of commercial banks will be rela-
tively easier than that of retail banks. 
The need for retail banking services in 
Mexico is expected to rise dramatically. Both 
exports and imports of the NAFTA countries are 
expected to grow due to the current reforms of 
President Salinas and NAFTA. As trade among 
Canada, Mexico and the United States grows, so 
will the need for banking instruments and 
banking expertise in foreign trade by retail 
banks. Furthermore, the Mexican economy is 
expected to grow at a real annual rate of 5.2 per-
cent with NAFTA. As Mexico's economy pro-
gresses and the number of middle-class and 
affluent Mexicans increases, the demand for 
retail banking services will grow. (Orr, p. 80) 
Insurance Firms 
Reforms 
Although Mexico's insurance industry is 
relatively small, insurance industry experts esti-
mate that Mexico could become one of the 
world's top ten insurance markets by the next 
century. (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993, p. 63) 
Currently there are forty-three insurance firms 
in Mexico; thirty-eight are equity companies, 
two are mutual companies, and three are state-
owned institutions. (Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, 
p. 314) Until1990, insurance was also a tightly 
regulated industry in Mexico. New foreign 
investment in the insurance sector had been 
prohibited since 1935. Those foreign compa-
nies which were already established in the sec-
tor at the time were allowed to remain, but they 
were required to reduce their participation to 
below fifty percent of market share. (Canadian 
Embassy, p. 31) This maximum investment was 
later reduced even further to fifteen percent. A$ 
with the banking sector, the May 1989 
Regulations to the Foreign Investment Law 
included the insurance sector as an activity 
which would continue to be restricted. 
Insurance was classified in category 2, activities 
reserved for Mexican nationals. However, dereg-
ulation did appear in the following year. 
The reforms of 1990 eliminated the 
restrictions on foreign insurance firms by rais-
ing the maximum permissible level of foreign 
investment to forty-nine percent. However, the 
acquisition by foreign investors of ten percent 
or more of an insurance firm requires the per-
mission of the Secretariat of Finance and Public 
Credit. 
Notwithstanding the easing of foreign 
investment restrictions, Mexican national 
insurance firms remain largely protected from 
foreign competition. For example, premiums 
paid by business firms for certain types of insur-
ance policies are tax deductible only if the 
insurance is purchased from a Mexican firm. 
(Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, p. 317) Moreover, 
many insurance services are reserved exclu-
sively for national firms. Examples of such serv-
ices include motor vehicle insurance for any 
motor vehicle which has Mexican license plates 
or that is owned by a Mexican resident, and 
insurance of imported or exported goods if a 
Mexican is liable for the risk. (Hufbauer and 
Schot~ 1992,p.317) 
Investment in Technology and 
Training 
Mexican insurance firms appear to be 
unable to provide adequate services in three 
areas: insuring large risks, managing pension 
plans, and insuring professional risks. 
(Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, p. 315) As in the 
case of banking, these weaknesses and ineffi-
ciencies are largely due to less-than-adequate 
investment in technology and training. Because 
the insurance industry was so highly protected 
from outside competition, it became under-
capitalized, inefficient and technologically 
weak. These three factors provide a perfect 
avenue for foreign companies to apply their 
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resources and skills to areas where Mexican 
insurance firms are deficient. Greater invest-
ment is needed in both technology and train-
ing employees in order for Mexic.an insurance 
firms to become competitive with firms in 
Canada and the United States. 
Benefits from NAFTA for U.S. 
Insurance Firms 
Under NAFTA many of the restrictions that 
hindered U.S. ownership and services in the 
Mexican insurance market will be eliminated. 
Specifically, when the agreement goes into 
effect, U.S. insurance companies will be able to 
sell cargo insurance and reinsurance on a cross-
border basis in Mexico. Reinsurance takes place 
when one insurance firm allocates a portion of 
its return and risk to another insurance firm. 
(Madura, p. 709) Furthermore, U.S. insurance 
firms will be allowed to sell health, life, and 
travel insurance to Mexican residents who come 
to the United States. 
In addition, new U.S. entrants will be able 
to enter the Mexican market. U.S. insurance 
firms that acquire interest in an existing 
Mexican firm to form joint ventures may 
increase their ownership in such ventures. 
They will be allowed to become thirty-percent 
owners in 1994, fifty-one percent (majority) 
owners in 1998, and finally one-hundred per-
cent owners by 2000. U.S. insurance firms with 
existing joint ventures in Mexico will be per-
mitted to increase their equity participation to 
one hundred percent by January 1, 1996. Those 
entrants that wish to start their own wholly 
owned subsidiaries in Mexico will still be sub-
ject to certain size limitations, but the current 
limitation of six percent of market share will 
increase to twelve percent in 1999, and will be 
eliminated on January 1, 2000. 
Mexico's insurance industry has great 
potential for growth, and NAFTA will benefit 
both Mexican and U.S. insurance firms. Once 
NAFTA reforms are fully implemented, it is esti-
mated that the Mexican insurance industry can 
generate fifty billion dollars in life and casual-
ty insurance premiums annually. (Hufbauer 
and Schott, 1993, pp. 63-64) Furthermore, 
NAFTA will stimulate competition in Mexico 
and will make for a stronger and more effective 
Mexican insurance industry. Mexican insurers 
will become more service oriented and will gain 
access to new expertise and skills. On the other 
hand, U.S. insurers will profit from Mexico's 
immature market. The clear superiority of U.S. 
insurers is likely to increase demand for U.S. 
insurance services. 
Conclusion 
Many have argued that NAFTA should 
have taken an immediate liberalization 
approach for the Mexican financial services sec-
tor. This would have fostered an atmosphere of 
high competition and rapid change among the 
NAFTA countries. However, the culture and 
pride of the Mexican people must be taken into 
consideration. The immediate entrance of huge 
foreign banks and insurance firms in Mexico 
would have been overwhelming to Mexico's 
financial services sector and would have struck 
at the heart of Mexican financial sovereignty. 
(Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, p. 324) 
Instead NAFTA has chosen a slower and 
gradual opening of the Mexican financial serv-
ices sector to United States and Canadian finan-
cial firms. Although NAFTA reforms do estab-
lish some immediate new opportunities for 
these firms, the majority of the reforms will be 
phased in through a transition period ending 
in the year 2000. NAFTA will ultimately allow 
foreign majority ownership in the financial 
services sector, and will require non-discrimi-
natory treatment. In turn, foreign investment 
and trade in financial services will eventually 
increase above the present levels. In the long 
term, it is anticipated that both Mexico and the 
United States will benefit from the deregulation 
of the financial services sector in Mexico. 
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